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Abstract
The desire to obtain an unconditionally secure bit commitment protocol in quantum cryp-
tography was expressed for the first time thirteen years ago. Bit commitment is sufficient in
quantum cryptography to realize a variety of applications with unconditional security. In 1993,
a quantum bit commitment protocol was proposed together with a security proof. However,
a basic flaw in the protocol was discovered by Mayers in 1995 and subsequently by Lo and
Chau. Later the result was generalized by Mayers who showed that unconditionally secure bit
commitment is impossible. A brief review on quantum bit commitment which focuses on the
general impossibility theorem and on recent attempts to bypass this result is provided.
1 Introduction
After that Mayers obtained his general impossibility theorem for bit commitment (see the Ap-
pendix and [1, 2]), different kind of ideas were proposed by Brassard, Cre´peau and Salvail with
the hope to realise unconditionally secure bit commitment [3]. It was then realized by Mayers
that these apparently promising ideas were also ruled out by his attack. These attempts con-
tributed to enhance our understanding of what is going on with quantum bit commitment[4].
However, no complete discussion on the subject has ever been provided in the litterature.
Furthermore, two different proofs, each using a different approach, was provided by Mayers.
The first approach was used in the original proof (see the Appendix and [1]) whereas the second
approach appeared later in [2]. Despite all these results, and the related discussion by Lo and
Chau [5], some quantum bit commitment protocols were recently proposed [6, 7] together with
a claim of security that is ruled out by the general result. Fortunately, these claims [7] were not
published. In fact, the protocols used the same idea previously described in [3, 4]. A brief history
of the result with proper references to original work seems appropriate. We will not describe
the proofs again (except in the Appendix which contains the original proof of Mayers). Our
objective is to create a wholeness for the different papers written on the subject. We will also
discuss the general theorem in the context of the specific ideas and schemes [3] which researchers
have tried to realize quantum bit commitment despite this general theorem.
Before we proceed, let us briefly explain the notion of bit commitment and its impact in
quantum cryptography. Quantum cryptography is often associated with a cryptographic ap-
plication called key distribution [8, 9] and it has achieved success in this area [3]. However,
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other applications of quantum mechanics to cryptography have also been considered and bit
commitment was at the basis of most if not all of these other applications [3, 10, 11, 12]. A bit
commitment scheme allows Alice to send something to Bob that commits her to a bit b of her
choice in such a way that Bob cannot tell what b is, but such that Alice can later prove him
what b originally was. You may think of this as Alice sending a note with the value b written
on it in a strongbox to Bob and later revealing him the combination to the safe.
Alice can choose the distribution of probability of b during the commit phase. The com-
mitment obtained after the commit phase is binding if Alice cannot change this distribution of
probability and it is concealing if Bob cannot obtain any information about b without the help
of Alice. The commitent is secure if it is binding and concealing. The commitment is uncondi-
tionally secure if it is secure against a cheater, either Alice or Bob, with unlimited technology
and computational power. In 1993 a protocol for quantum bit commitment, henceforth referred
to as BCJL, was claimed to be provably secure [11], that is, the resulting commitments were
thought to be unconditionally secure. Because of quantum bit commitment, the future of quan-
tum cryptography was very bright, with new applications such as the identification protocol of
Cre´peau and Salvail [13] coming up regularly.
The trouble began in October 1995 when Mayers found a subtle flaw in the BCJL proto-
col. Though Mayers explained his discovery to many researchers interested in quantum bit
commitment [14], his result was not made entirely public until after Lo and Chau discovered
independently a similar result in March 1996 [15]. The result of Mayers was more general than
the one obtained by Lo and Chau, but both used the same basic idea. The result of Lo and
Chau did not encompass the BCJL protocol in which Bob can obtain an exponentially small
amount of information. (In practice a protocol is considered secure as long as Bob cannot obtain
more than an exponentially small amount of information on the bit commited by Alice, that
is, an amount of information that goes exponentially fast to 0 as the number of photons used
in the protocol increases.) However, the final version published by Lo and Chau [15] used the
techniques previously used by Mayers [14] to prove the non security of the BCJL protocol and
any other protocol published at the time. So, the paper of Lo and Chau [15] is a proper account
of these preliminary results.
2 The general impossibility theorem
Now, we review the general theorem [2] (see also the Appendix) which says that a quantum
protocol which creates an unconditionally secure bit commitment is simply impossible. The
main additionnal difficulty in the general result is that it is easy to think that measurements
and classical communication could be used to restrict the behavior of the cheater during the
commit phase, and thus obtain a secure bit commitment. In fact, after BCJL was shown not
secure, the spontaneous attitude was to try alternative quantum bit commitment protocols
by making some clever use of measurements and classical communication [16]. Some of these
protocols were proposed after that Mayers obtained the general result in March 1996 (just a little
bit after Lo and Chau discovered their restricted result independently). All of these protocols
were found not secure by Mayers.
There exists two approaches to deal with measurements and classical communication in
quantum bit commitment protocols: an indirect approach and a direct approach. In the first
proof written by Mayers (see the Appendix) the indirect approach was used. It was shown that
any protocol in which classical information is used is equivalent to another protocol in which
no classical information at all is used. Then it was shown that no protocol of the latter kind
is unconditionally secure. The first step of this indirect proof is called a reduction in computer
science. The advantage of this approach is that, after the reduction is shown, the attack on the
new protocol is easy to describe and analyse because there is no classical communication any-
more. The disadvantage is that we don’t deal directly with the issue of classical communication
and measurements, that is, the attack obtained against the new protocol is not the one that
applies on the original protocol. The attack in the new protocol does not include any classical
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communication, whereas in the original protocol the cheater must communicate classically with
the honest participant (otherwise this honest participant will wonder what is going on).
We emphasize that the proof of the reduction which is not that hard must nevertheless explain
why the cheater can still cheat in the original protocol despite the fact that he is restricted by
measurements and decoherence which must occur because of classical communication. Otherwise
the overall proof would simply miss the important issue of classical communication – it would
not encompass the protocols and ideas that have been proposed recently [3, 4, 6, 7]. Because this
issue was somehow confusing, Mayers prefered to use a more direct approach without reduction
in [2]. So, the paper [2] directly describes and analyses the real attack that must be executed
by the cheater.
Lo and Chau also wrote a paper [5] to discuss the issue of quantum communication and other
aspects of Mayers’s result. They used a variant of Yao’s model for quantum communication.
The essence of Yao’s model is that a third system is passed back and fourth under the control
of each participant at their turn [12]. Mayers’s attack works fine in this model, and it is indeed
important to verify that the attack works in such a reasonable model. With regard to classical
communication, the discussion of Lo and Chau [5] is similar to the indirect approach.
Now, let us consider the attack. Of course, we are interested in the attack on the original
protocol. The attack on the new protocol is just a construction in a proof. We emphasize that
in both approaches, with a reduction or without a reduction, the attack on the original protocol
is the same. Here we focus on the part of the attack which must be executed during the commit
phase. (The remainder of the attack which is executed after the commit phase is the same as
when there is no classical communication, so it creates no additional difficulty.) One ingredient
in the attack is that the cheater keeps every thing at the quantum level except what must be
announced classically. Assume that at some given stage of the commit phase, a participant has
normally generated a classical random variable R, executed measurements to obtain an overall
outcome X , and shared some classical information Y with the other participant as a result of
previous communication. Now, assume that this participant is the cheater and that the protocol
says he must transmit some classical information f(X,R, Y ), which for simplicity we assume
is a binary string. One might think that the cheater must have generated X and executed the
measurements, or at the least some of them, in order to be able to compute and send f(X,R, Y ).
However, the cheater does not have to do that. He can do the entire computation of f(X,R, Y ),
including the computation of X and the measurements, at the quantum level. Only Y needs
to be classical. Then he can measure the bits of the string f(X,R, Y ) (only these bits) and
send them to the other participant. An example is given in section 3. The final result is that
every information is kept at the quantum level, except what must be sent classically to the other
participant. As explained in [1, 2] (see also the Appendix) this strategy executed during the
commit phase either allows Bob to obtain some information about the bit commited by Alice,
without any help from Alice, or else allows Alice to change her mind after the commit phase
(as in the example of section 3).
This is not the end of the story. After that the above argument was understood, Cre´peau
proposed a quantum protocol [3, 4] that uses a computationally secure classical bit commitment
[17, 18] as a subprotocol. The idea was to rely temporarily on the limitation (in speed) on the
cheater during the commit phase to force him to execute some measurements (or restrict his
behavior in some other way) in order to obtain a secure bit commitment. The hope was that
this short-term assumption could be dropped after the commit phase so as to obtain a quantum
bit commitment not relying on any long-term assumption. The same idea was recently used
by Kent in [7]. Salvail also proposed a protocol in which two participants, Alice and Albert
say, want to commit a bit to Bob. Alice and Albert are sufficiently far apart that they cannot
communicate during the commit phase. Again the hope was that this temporary restriction
on the cheaters during the commit phase would be sufficient to obtain a secure quantum bit
commitment not relying on any long-term assumption.
However, after some thoughts, one realize that the cheater in Mayers’s attack executes the
honest algorithm, the only difference is that he executes this honest algorithm at the quantum
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level. Therefore, if the cheater has the power to execute the honest protocol (which he must
have) and has the technology to store information at the quantum level, then he has the power
to cheat during the commit phase, despite the fact that he has not the power to break the
computationally secure bit commitment efficiently, or despite the fact that Alice and Albert
cannot communicate during the commit phase. After the commit phase, the rule of the game is
that we must drop the assumption on the computational power of the cheater, so the fact that
a computationally secure bit commitment was used is irrelevant: the proof applies.
3 An Example:How to Break Kent’s Protocol
In this section we illustrate the discussion of the previous section by a concrete example. We
shall show how to break Kent’s proposal [6, 7] for a quantum bit commitment scheme using a
time-bounded computational assumption. The paper [7] describes two constructions for such a
scheme, one allows Alice to commit and the other allows Bob to commit permanently. In this
section we break the protocol allowing Alice to commit permanently. The other version can be
broken by a similar attack.
Kent’s protocol [7] uses a classical and unconditionally hidding bit commitment scheme. The
hope is that this classical scheme will constraint Alice to transmit q-bits in pure states. The
protocol uses the BB84 coding scheme: Ψ(0, 0) = |0〉+,Ψ(0, 1) = |1〉+,Ψ(1, 0) = |0〉×,Ψ(1, 1) =
|1〉×. The first bit corresponds to the basis and the second bits to the encoded bit. Here is
the essential idea behind Kent’s protocol. For each i = 1, . . . , NB, Alice picks a random pair
(x, z) = (xi, zi) ∈ {0, 1}2, sends a photon pii in the BB84 state Ψ(x, z) and execute a classical
bit commitment BC(x, z) according to the above classical bit commitment scheme. We denote1
θi = {+,×}[x] the basis used by Alice for the photon pii. Bob then picks a random sample
X ⊆ {1, . . . , NB} of size NB − N . For each i ∈ X , Bob asks Alice to unveil (x, z) ∈ {0, 1}2
corresponding to the committed pair of classical bits in BC(x, z). Bob then measures pii in basis
θi = {+,×}[x] and verifies that the observed outcome is indeed z ∈ {0, 1}. The idea behind the
remainder of Kent’s protocol is very similar to the first bit commitment scheme ever proposed
by [8]. The difference is that in [8] Alice picks the same value for all xi, that is, the string of
bases used by Alice is either ++. . .+ or ××. . .×. (See also [2, 15] for a description and analysis
of this protocol.) The basic idea is that the committed bit is encoded in the transmission basis
for each photon pii. In Kent’s protocol, if Alice wants to commit bit b, she announces xi ⊕ b for
each i ∈ Y = {1, . . . , NB} −X . So, the bit is commited in the choice of basis used by Alice for
each i ∈ Y .
The scheme is unconditionnally hidding because no information about the transmission basis
can be obtained from any photon pii since the density matrix corresponding to the transmission
in rectilinear basis
ρ+ =
1
2
|0〉+〈0|+ + 1
2
|1〉+〈1|+
and the one corresponding to the transmission in diagonal basis
ρ× =
1
2
|0〉×〈0|× + 1
2
|1〉×〈1|×
are such that ρ+ = ρ×.
Clearly, if sends the pure states Ψ(xi, zi), she cannot claim that she used the other basis,
that is, the one associated with xi ⊕ 1, for each i ∈ Y . So, if really Alice has sent the pure
states Ψ(xi, zi), the protocol should be binding. Alice can cheat in the original protocol of
[8] by sending EPR pairs rather than a mixture of BB84 quantum states (see [8] for more
details). So the resulting commitment is not binding. In Kent’s protocol, if Alice cannot break
the computational assumption during this test phase (between the time the commitments have
been sent and the time they are opened), it is argued that Bob gets convinced that almost all
1Notation {a, b}[s] for s ∈ {0, 1} is a if s = 0 and b if s = 1.
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photons pii in Y are in the pure states Ψ(xi, zi). Indeed, if this was true then the protocol would
also be binding. However, we show that it is not the case.
3.1 The Classical Commitment
Let us first model the classical and unconditionally hiding commitment scheme by four one-way
permutations 2 f00, f01, f10, f11 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n for any integer n. In the remaining, functions
f00, f01, f10 and f11 need not to be distinct. To commit (x, z), Alice picks a random uniformly
distributed w ∈ {0, 1}n and sends y = fxz(w) to Bob. We obtain that y, the piece of evidence
that Alice gives to Bob in order to commit on a pair of classical bit (x, z), is a random element
uniformly distributed in {0, 1}n. Here are the properties that we need to consider.
1. The functions fxz are efficiently computable and publicly known.
2. Given y = fxz(w) no information on (x, z) is known by Bob (thus the protocol is uncon-
ditionally hiding).
3. Alice knows only one (x, z, w) ∈ {0, 1}2×{0, 1}n such that fxz(w) = y. If she manages to
find another (x′, z′, w′) ∈ {0, 1}2 × {0, 1}n distinct from (x, z, w) such that fx′z′(w′) = y
then she can break the computational assumption (because necessarily (x, z) 6= (x′, z′)).
We shall see that the above conditions for classical commitment, in particular the first two
conditions, implies that the proposed method cannot ensure Bob that most of the remaining
q-bits are in pure states. We have described a particular classical bit commitment scheme,
but Mayers’s attack works with any other classical bit commitment scheme. In the next two
subsections we describe Alice’s attacks during the commit phase, then in the third subsection
we explain how Alice can change her mind after the commit phase.
3.2 Alice’s Preparation
If Alice wants to cheat the proposed protocol, as we will see, she has only to send entangled
states rather than a mixture of BB84 states. In Kent’s protocol, the use of a classical bit
commitment scheme is intended to rule out the EPR attack. However, other entanglements can
do the job. Let us consider the state |γ(θ)〉 defined upon 3 θ ∈ {+,×} as 4
|γ(θ)〉 = 1√
2n+1
∑
w∈{0,1}n
|w〉|fθ0(w)〉|0〉θ |0〉θ + |w〉|fθ1(w)〉|1〉θ |1〉θ. (1)
Mayers’s theorem also specifies that there should be a superposition over x (or equivalently over
θ). The idea is that every random choice, including the choice of the bases, must be done at
the quantum level. However, this part of the superposition would collapse immediately because
Alice must announce xi ⊕ b, for the classical bit b she has chosen (this is what is specified by
the attack). So for simplicity we ignore this part of the superposition.
The state (1) can be efficiently constructed from condition 1 about the classical commitment
scheme. The state |γ(θ)〉 is made out of four registers which we denote from left to right
as rw, rf , r
A
z and r
B
z . Now suppose Alice sends the register rBz to Bob instead of a random
BB84 pure state. We assume the more general case where Bob does not measure the received
quantum states until the pure states verifications take place. This allows a more reliable test
than measuring immediately after reception and testing later on. Let HA be the Hilbert space
2The same kind of argument can also be formalized for general one-way functions rather than one-way permuta-
tions. However, no classical and unconditionally bidding bit commitment scheme is yet known to be based only on
the existence of one-way functions.
3In the following we sometime consider θ ∈ {+,×} as being the bit x such that θ = {+,×}[x]. Notations f+z(x)
means f0z(x) and f×z(x) means f1z(x).
4When a quantum state is written as |w〉 for w ∈ {0, 1}n we mean |w1〉+ ⊗ . . .⊗ |wn〉+.
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for registers rw, rf and r
A
z and let HB be the Hilbert space for register r
B
z . By construction,
Bob receives a mixture with density matrix:
ρB = TrHA(|γ(θ)〉〈γ(θ)|) = ρθ. (2)
Alice’s preparation consists of NB systems s1, . . . , sNB in quantum states |γ(θ1)〉, . . . , |γ(θNB )〉
for θi ∈R {+.×}. She sends to Bob the rBz registers for all systems s1, . . . , sNB .
3.3 How Alice Deals With Classical Communication
Suppose Alice has sent all NB registers rBz to Bob. Let θ1, . . . , θNB be the NB bases picked
in {+,×} in order to prepare the states |γ(θ1)〉, . . . , |γ(θN)〉. (From Alice’s point of view these
bases, i.e. the xi, are not random anymore.) To execute the classical commitment, Alice must
send the classical information fxz(w). Thus far, the values of z and w are not fixed: they are
still in superposition. As explained in the previous section, Alice does not have to obtain w nor
z classically to compute fxz(w). For committing, Alice simply measures in rectilinear basis all
registers rf . She then announces to Bob, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the result yi. That is the way
Mayers’s attack works. Each system si is now in state
|γ′(θi)〉 = 1√
2
(|w〉|yi〉|0〉θi |0〉θi + |w′〉|yi〉|1〉θi |1〉θi)
where w = f−1θi0(yi) and w
′ = f−1θi1(yi). The above state is guaranteed to occur by property 2 of
the classical commitment scheme, and the fact that w is uniquely determined by x (or θ), z and
y.
Now suppose Bob asks Alice to unveil the commitment for some position i ∈ X . Alice
simply measures registers rw (in basis +) and r
A
z (in basis θi) for the system si. Let w and z
be the outcomes of the measurement. Alice announces w, z and xi to Bob. Bob always verifies
that yi = fxiz(w). The system ends up in state
|γ′′(θi)〉 = |w〉|yi〉|z〉θi |z〉θi
which leads to a successful verification by Bob. Clearly Alice can always pass the test without
breaking the computational assumption. The main point is that Alice executes the honest
protocol at the quantum level, so any computational bound is useless. It follows that Kent’s
verification procedure is not a verification that almost all received q-bits are in pure states since
equation 2 is obviously not the description of a pure state.
3.4 Breaking the Quantum Scheme
We now show how Alice can decide freely the bit she wants to unveil. We recall that, at this
point, the rule of the game is that all computational assumptions must be dropped. (Otherwise
we only have a computationally secure bit commitment, and this can already be done classically.)
After the verification procedure only the remaining systems si with i ∈ Y = {1, . . . , N} \X are
used. In order to break the quantum protocol it is sufficient to show how Alice can choose the
transmission basis for all photons transmitted to Bob. For all i ∈ Y the system si is in state (we
remove the rf register since it is no more entangled but we remember its observed value yi):
|γ′(θi)〉 = 1√
2
(|w〉|0〉θi |0〉θi + |w′〉|1〉θi |1〉θi) .
To cheat, Alice must disentangle the register rw and obtain the state
|γ′′(θi)〉 = 1√
2
(|w0〉|0〉θi |0〉θi + |w0〉|1〉θi |1〉θi) .
6
where w0 is some fixed string. If we ignore the disentangled registers rf and rw, this state
is essentially an EPR pair (modulo a unitary transformation on Alice’s side). So Alice can
cheat as in the original attack defined in [8]. Now, we show how Alice can disentangle rw. A
simple way to disentangle rw would be to replace both w and w
′ by the same output fθi0(w) =
fθi1(w
′) = yi. This is a reversible computation executed in the computational basis defined by
θi for r
A
z and + . . .+ for rw, so it corresponds to a unitary transformation. This answers the
question. However, this answer is somehow misleading because it gives the impression that the
attack is as simple as the computation of fθi0(w) = fθi1(w
′) = yi. The problem is that one must
still explain how the two distinct inputs w and w′ can be replaced by one and the same value
yi. Here we show how this can be done by Alice if she can inverse the functions fθiz. Because
she knows yi and θi, she can compute w = f
−1
θi0
(yi) associated with |0〉θi and w′ = f−1θi1(yi)
associated with |1〉θi , so she can “erase” the register rw, that is, she can set this register to 0 by
a bit-wise addition modulo 2. (She can also set it to any other value she wants, including yi.)
This concludes the description of the attack.
Although Alice breaks the computational assumption (i.e. inverse the functions fxz) in order
to unveil the bit she wishes, this cannot be used as a building block for a secure quantum bit
commitment where the computational assumption is no more needed after some time. This is
for exactly the same reason than the one allowing to conclude that no quantum bit commitment
can be built from a classical computational assumption.
4 Conclusions
The first proof provided for the impossibility of bit commitment (see the Appendix) has com-
pletely obliterated the possibility of creating an unconditionally secure bit commitment. How-
ever, the attack was only indirectly described. Subsequently, specific attempts to by-pass this
general result were proposed[3, 4]. This has shed more light on the nature of the attack which
was finally described explicitly in [2]. Our goal here was to provide an analysis of this general
attack in the context of a specific example, and to create a wholeness for the different papers
published on the subject. The big lesson to learn from all this is that quantum information is
always more elusive than its classical counterpart: extra care must be taken when reasoning
about quantum cryptographic protocols and analyzing them. We hope that this paper will help
to clarify the issue of the impossibility of bit commitment in its full generality.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the original proof written by Mayers and sent to few researchers by
email on March 14 1996. A modified version of the proof, which also used a reduction, was
published in [1]. A direct proof with no reduction was published later in [2].
Abstract
It is currently known that the 1993 BCJL protocol of Brassard, Cre´peau, Jozsa
and Langlois (BCJL) is insecure. Here we provide the first proof that, not only
this protocol, but any quantum bit commitment is either insecure against Alice or
insecure against Bob.
1 Introduction
The fact that the quantum bit commitment protocol of Brassard, Cre´peau, Jozsa and Langlois
[11] is insecure is known for quite sometime [14]. Lo and Chau have also independently shown
that a restricted category of quantum bit commitments is insecure [15]. Now, we provide the
first proof that not only these quantum bit commitment protocols, but any other quantum bit
commitment protocol is insecure.
The absence of quantum bit commitment is a serious concern because other quantum proto-
cols such as quantum oblivious transfer depend on the security of bit commitment [10, 19, 20, 12].
On the other hand, not all of Quantum Cryptography fall apart because our earlier proof of
security for quantum key distribution [21] holds even if secure quantum bit commitment is not
possible despite the fact that it is based on an earlier “proof” of security for quantum oblivious
transfer that fails in the absence of a secure bit commitment scheme. The reason is that the
proof of security for quantum key distribution does not depend on the security of quantum
oblivious transfer, but rather on the (correct) proof that quantum oblivious transfer would be
secure if implemented on top of a secure bit commitment scheme.
2 Bit Commitment
Any cryptographic task defines the relationship between inputs and outputs respectively entered
and received by the task’s participants. In bit commitment, Alice enters a bit b. At a later
time, Bob may request this bit and, whenever he does, he receives this bit, otherwise he learns
nothing about b.
In a naive but concrete realization of bit commitment, Alice puts the bit into a strong-box of
which she keeps the key and then gives this strong-box to Bob. At a later time, if Bob requests
the bit, Alice gives the key to Bob. The main point is that Alice cannot change her mind about
the bit b and Bob learns nothing about it unless he obtains the key.
3 Quantum Bit Commitment: the attack
For every quantum bit commitment protocol Q, we shall construct a protocol Q˜, show that the
security of Q implies the security of Q˜ and then show that Q˜ is insecure.
Let A and B stand for Alice and Bob respectively. For any bit commitment protocol Q, the
state spaceH is of the formHA⊗HB whereHA andHB are state spaces onAlice’s side and Bob’s
side respectively. Alice’s and Bob’s generation of classical variables, measurements, unitary
transformations, etc in the commit phase of Q can be modeled by two global measurements, one
on Alice’s side and the other one on Bob’s side. These two measurements together correspond to
an overall measurement on the entire state spaceH = HA⊗HB. This single overall measurement
corresponds to the entire commit phase of Q.
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Now, we construct Q˜. For every P ∈ {A,B}, the state space on P ’s side is of the form
H˜P = HP ⊗H ′P . The entire state space is H˜ = H˜A ⊗ H˜B . The additional parts H ′A and H ′B
are used to store the outcome of the overall measurement executed by Alice and Bob together,
that is, the overall measurement executed by Alice and Bob in the commit phase of Q becomes
a unitary transformation on H˜ . At the opening phase (or just after the commit phase), Bob
and Alice obtain the classical variables stored in their respective systems H ′A and H ′B, that is
they execute the measurements that they normally execute in Q, and they continue with the
opening phase as in Q.
It is not hard to see that the non security of Q˜ implies the non security of Q. Assume that
P ∈ {A,B} can cheat in Q˜. A dishonest P in Q can do exactly as P in Q˜. The resulting random
situation in Q after the commit phase is the same random situation that holds in Q˜ after that
the other participant P¯ has measured his quantum system H ′
P¯
. So, if P succeed in Q˜, P also
succeed in Q.
Now, we must show that Q˜ is insecure. It is a principle that we must assume that every
participant knows every detail of the protocol, including the distribution of probability of a
random variable generated by another participant. There is no loss of generality in assuming
that at the beginning of the protocol, the overall system is in a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ H˜ = H˜A⊗ H˜B:
the preparation of a mixture could be included as a part of the protocol. The commit phase of
the protocol specifies a unitary transformation Ub on the entire system. So at the end of the
commit phase, the overall system is in a final state |φb〉 = Ub|ψ〉.
It is fair to assume that every thing outside H˜A is under the control of a dishonest Bob. In
other words, there are no third system H˜C . For b = 0, 1, let ρ
A
b and ρ
B
b be the partial traces of
|φb〉〈φb| over H˜B and H˜A respectively. The density matrices ρB0 and ρB1 on Bob’s side must be
close one to the other, otherwise Bob can cheat. We shall do the simpler case ρB0 = ρB1 . The
more subtle case where the density matrices are not identical is done in the next section.
Consider the Schmidt decomposition [22, 23] of |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 respectively given by
|φ0〉 =
∑
i
√
λi|e(0)i 〉 ⊗ |fi〉
and
|φ1〉 =
∑
i
√
λi|e(1)i 〉 ⊗ |fi〉
In the above formula, λi are eigenvalues of the density matrices ρ
B, ρA0 and ρ
A
1 . The fact
that these density matrices share the same positive eigenvalues with the same multiplicity is
part of the Schmidt decomposition theorem [22, 23]. The states |e(b)i 〉 and |fi〉 are respectively
eigenstates of ρAb and ρ
B associated with the same eigenvalue λi. Clearly, the same unitary
transformation that maps |e(0)i 〉 into |e(1)i 〉 also maps |φ(0)〉 into |φ(1)〉. We recall that Alice
knows what are the states |φ0〉 and |φ1〉. Therefore, she can determine the above unitary
transformation.
In order to cheat, Alice creates the state |φ0〉. In other words, Alice does what she must
honestly do when she has b = 0 in mind. With the state |φ(0)〉 Alice is able to convince Bob
that she had b = 0 in mind: Alice has only to open the bit as an honest Alice would in Q˜ with
b = 0 in mind. If Alice want to change her mind, she only has to maps |φ(0)〉 into |φ(1)〉 before
she continue the opening phase as if she had b = 1 in mind.
4 The real situation
Now, we consider the real situation where the density matrices ρ0 and ρ1 are not identical. If
the protocol is to be secure against Bob, the density matrices ρ0 and ρ1 must respect some
constraint. We express this constraint in terms of measurements on the n photons that return a
binary classical outcome X ∈ {0, 1}. We recall that Alice prepares the density matrix ρb when
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she has b in mind, that is, when B = b. Without loss of generality, we take the convention
that P (X = 0|B = 0) ≥ P (X = 0|B = 1). We denote Xb the random variable X conditioned
by B = b so that P (X = x|B = b) = P (Xb = x). The constraint is
∣∣∣∣ 12 − PE
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
1
2
−
1∑
b=0
P (B = b) P
(
Xb = b¯
) ∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−αn.
This constraint says that no matter which measurement Bob uses to decide between B = 0 and
B = 1, the probability of error is exponentially close to 1/2. It has been shown in [14, 24],
building on the work of [22, 25], that this implies the existence of two purifications |ψ0〉 and
|ψ1〉 for ρB0 and ρB1 respectively such that
〈ψ0|ψ1〉2 ≥ (1 − 2× 2−αn).
We have that |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are almost the same state.
In order to cheat, Alice prepares the state |ψ0〉. If she want to unveil b = 0, using the
same argument as in the simpler case, she maps |ψ0〉 into |φ0〉 and continue as in the honest
Q˜ when she has b = 0 in mind. If she wants to unveil b = 1, she executes on |ψ0〉 the unitary
transformation F that would map |ψ1〉 into |φ1〉. She obtains the state F |ψ0〉. The inner product
between the desired state |φ1〉 = F |ψ1〉 and the actual state F |ψ0〉, is the same as the inner
product 〈ψ1|ψ0〉 which is exponentially close to 1. So, for all practical purpose, Alice can cheat
as in the simpler case by applying this transformation F and then continuing as in the honest Q′
when she has b = 1 in mind. This concludes the proof that every bit quantum bit commitment
is insecure.
Note that as a consequence, Yao’s proof of security for Quantum Oblivious Transfer [12] fails
because it is built on insecure foundations (through no fault of Yao). Ironically, as we stated
in the Introduction, the proof of security for Quantum Key Distribution shown in [21] stands
despite the fact that it draws on Yao’s work because it does not depend on the security of Bit
Commitment.
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